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Evidence of Information Spillovers in the Production of 
Investment Banking Services 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We present evidence that firms attempting IPOs learn from the experience of their 
contemporaries. These information spillovers affect revisions in offer terms and the decision 
whether to carry through with an offering. The evidence also supports the argument that IPOs are 
implicitly bundled as a means of promoting more equitable sharing of information production 
costs. One apparent consequence of this behavior is that while initial returns and IPO volume are 
positively correlated in the aggregate, the correlation is negative among contemporaneous 
offerings subject to a common valuation factor. These findings are consistent with the 
Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2001) argument that the dynamics of volume and initial 
returns in primary equity markets reflect, at least in part, an institutional response to information 
externalities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the second half of 1999, at the height of the “dot.com” wave, 282 firms went public in the U.S. In 
the first half of 2001, only 46 firms went public. Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) document similar boom 
and bust patterns going back to 1960. Coupled with this pattern is the tendency for large initial 
returns during ‘hot’ markets [Lowry and Schwert (2000)]. Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2001) 
attempt to explain these patterns with a model in which the central assumption is that potential 
issuers benefit from information about a common valuation factor that spills over from the 
marketing efforts of other firms attempting public offerings. Under some circumstances, 
conditioning on information spillovers leads potential issuers to attempt IPOs themselves and 
thereby set off a wave among firms subject to the common valuation factor.  
But if information production is costly and becomes a public good during the marketing effort, 
any single firm has little incentive to lead the way. What then prevents the market from collapsing 
around the incentive for potential issuers to free-ride on one another? The explanation offered by 
Benveniste et al. (2001) is that given sufficient market power, investment banks resolve the 
coordination problem by implicitly ‘bundling’ IPOs and thereby enforcing more uniform sharing of 
the costs of information production. But they also show that this explanation implies negative 
correlation between average (percentage) initial returns and IPO volume among firms subject to a 
common valuation factor as there are more firms to share this indirect cost of information. This 
prediction stands in sharp contrast to the positive correlation observed for the IPO market at large. 
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of clustering in the IPO market through the lens 
suggested by Benveniste et al.  Drawing on 6,181 IPOs brought to market in the U.S. between 
January 1985 and December 2000, we find considerable evidence of information spillovers 
influencing decisions regarding whether a firm will complete an attempted IPO and if so how the 
offering is priced relative to prior expectations. We also find evidence that initial returns are 
smaller, the more firms sharing a common valuation factor go public in short succession. We 
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interpret this as evidence of bundling. In sum, the results are consistent with the presence of 
information externalities and the conjectured institutional response suggested by Benveniste et al., 
and complementary to those of Lowry and Schwert (2000). Lowry and Schwert document strong 
autocorrelation in initial returns and a pronounced direct effect of initial returns on future IPO 
volume. They interpret these patterns as evidence that potential issuers learn from the experience of 
other IPOs, as reflected in positive initial returns, and so are more likely to follow with their own 
offering.  
 
II. THEORY AND EMPIRICAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A growing body of literature considers the implications for industrial organization arising from 
information externalities in the production of investment banking services. Tufano (1989) and 
Persons and Warther (1997) observe that financial innovations are easily reverse-engineered and 
therefore difficult for pioneering firms to fully internalize their benefits. Like Benveniste, Busaba 
and Wilhelm (2001), Hoffman-Burchardi (2001) argues that information externalities diminish the 
incentive of innovators or issuing firms to undertake information production in the first place. 
Persons and Warther (1997) suggest that the equilibrium response to the externality problem will be 
a market structure dominated by a few key intermediaries who thereby gain the leverage necessary 
to internalize the benefits of pioneering efforts. Benveniste et al. establish the limits of the 
intermediary’s leverage in the context of IPOs and in doing so, arrive at a set of predictions 
regarding pricing and volume dynamics in primary equity markets.  
The Benveniste et al. model assumes that the realized value of a firm’s project has two sources 
of uncertainty: a factor common to all firms within a particular “industry”, and a firm-specific or 
idiosyncratic factor. The project can be financed either privately or through an initial public equity 
offering. Other things equal, the IPO is preferred for liquidity, risk sharing and visibility 
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considerations.1 When an IPO is attempted, the issuer seeks information regarding the value of its 
project from investors who have engaged in costly information production.2 Conditional on this 
feedback, the issuer either completes the IPO and funds its project, or withdraws. If the offering is 
withdrawn, the issuer has the option to fund the project privately or reject the project.3 Presumably, 
this enables firms to avoid investments in projects that unconditionally appeared positive NPV, but 
conditional on information gained through the bookbuilding effort, are revealed as negative NPV 
projects.  
Whether the firm completes or withdraws its IPO, information revealed through its 
bookbuilding effort is assumed to enter the public domain. The immediate consequence of this 
assumption is a coordination problem. This arises from the information externality produced by the 
first firm subject to a common valuation factor attempting an IPO. If pioneers bear the burden of 
compensating investors for costly information production, there is little incentive among firms 
subject to the common factor to be the first mover.4 Welfare declines as firms are discouraged from 
seeking out a potentially lower-cost source of funding.  
Benveniste et al. argue, however, that barriers to entry might enable investment banks to 
enforce a more equitable sharing of information production costs by implicitly bundling IPOs that 
share a common valuation factor.5 If underpricing reflects compensation to investors for their 
                                                           
1 The literature treats IPOs as being subject to both direct and indirect costs. The former include underwriting, legal and 
registration fees which generally are small relative to the indirect cost of ‘underpricing’ generally associated with some 
form of asymmetric information. Although Benveniste et al. abstract from the latter, in their footnote 9 they discuss the 
generality of the model’s predictions when extended to include the information acquisition game envisioned by 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and subsequent related work. Empirical evidence of strategic behavior in the 
‘bookbuilding’ process is perhaps best evidenced by the ‘partial adjustment phenomenon’ documented by Hanley 
(1993). For more recent and extensive evidence, see Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2001).  
2 See Sherman and Titman (2001) for a formal model of costly information acquisition in the bookbuilding context. 
3 In practice, withdrawal of a proposed offering is a common response to negative feedback. Dunbar (1998) finds that 
29% of the firm-commitment offerings registered with the SEC in a sample drawn from 1979-1982 were terminated 
prior to receiving SEC approval. Benveniste and Busaba (1996) report a 14% termination rate for firm-commitment 
offerings registered between 1988 and 1994, and Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001) observe a similar rate for the 
1984-94 period. 
4 Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) consider the case where firms make strategic decisions regarding the timing of a 
public offering. 
5 There is a gathering consensus that personal relationships and reputational considerations along with the industry’s 
dependence on (human) assets over which firms have weak property rights preclude perfect competition among 
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information production costs, banks can spread the burden of information production by 
‘smoothing’ underpricing across a ‘wave’ of IPOs subject to the valuation factor. Thus followers are 
made to bear some of the information production costs investors incurred in the pioneer’s IPO. 
Other things equal, the more followers there are, the more broadly information costs can be shared, 
and so underpricing should decrease in the size of the wave.  
Benveniste et al.’s analysis highlights that IPOs by firms subject to a common valuation factor 
are not independent events. Dependence suggests a variety of implications regarding how 
information spillovers influence the structure of the investment banking industry and the time series 
patterns in the indirect costs of going public. The structural econometric model outlined in the 
remainder of this section is designed to shed light on these implications. A precise empirical 
specification is provided after we describe the data and discuss several measurement concerns. 
 
Bookbuilding with information spillovers 
Benveniste et al. build on theory stemming from Benveniste and Spindt (1989). This body of theory 
predicts that an issuer conditions its offer price and share quantity (or total proceeds) on information 
acquired through its underwriter’s bookbuilding effort. For the purposes of this study, we define the 
bookbuilding phase of the offering as the period between the registration date (when an indicative 
price and offer amount are established) and the offer (or withdrawal) date. A growing body of 
empirical research that focuses on revisions to indicative prices supports the hypothesis that firms 
acquire information from investors through their own bookbuilding efforts.6  
Benveniste et al. make the additional prediction that firms also learn from the bookbuilding 
efforts of contemporaries that are subject to the same valuation factor. Our empirical work 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
investment banks. There is less agreement regarding the consequences of imperfect competition. See Persons and 
Warther (1997), Anand and Galetovic (2000), Loughran and Ritter (2000), and Pichler and Wilhelm (2000). 
6 See Hanley (1993), Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm 
(2001), and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2001). 
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investigates learning in response to information revealed via contemporaries’ withdrawal and 
pricing decisions, their underpricing experience, and the rate of new registrations by related firms. 
Learning, in turn, should be reflected in a firm’s own revisions to its offer terms, including the 
possibility of withdrawal.  
The indicative price range and quantity included in an issuer’s registration (S-1) filing should 
reflect all public information, including any thrown off by contemporaries’ bookbuilding efforts 
already underway. However, Lowry and Schwert (2001) provide evidence that indicative prices do 
not fully incorporate such information. Thus, in modeling the learning that takes place during the 
bookbuilding phase we distinguish between common-factor information that is already available on 
the registration date, and that which spills over between the registration and offering (or 
withdrawal) date.  
Although not a direct implication of the Benveniste et al. model, we expect the effect of 
information spillovers to be stronger among pioneers and early followers than among firms later in 
an IPO wave. This prediction about the dynamics of learning rests on uncertainty about the common 
valuation factor declining over a sequence of offerings as more information enters the public 
domain. If this assumption holds, later offerings are more likely to incorporate common-factor 
information produced by earlier IPOs in their indicative offer terms and therefore will not exhibit as 
strong dependence on the marketing efforts of their immediate contemporaries.  
In this model of learning, two potential control variables warrant special attention. If firm 
valuation is a function of both common and idiosyncratic factors and our goal is to study how 
common factor information is acquired and used by issuing firms, it is necessary to control for 
idiosyncratic uncertainty. We therefore include a range of uncertainty proxies previously used in the 
literature. Secondly, there is considerable theory and evidence suggesting that underwriters differ in 
their abilities and we expect this to map into the learning occurring during the bookbuilding process 
[Carter and Manaster (1990)]. However, controlling for these differences among underwriters is 
  
6
complicated if issuers select their underwriter conditional on knowledge of these differences. We 
provide a more detailed discussion of endogenous underwriter choice below.  
This discussion suggests a model of the following general form for individual firm learning 
during the bookbuilding phase: 
 
Proceeds revisions =  f1(spillovers from contemporaneous IPOs (pre-filing and  [1] 
 bookbuilding phase), issuer’s position in an IPO wave, 
idiosyncratic uncertainty, underwriter choice) 
 
 
Clustering and initial returns 
Our initial return model embodies the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) hypothesis that discounted 
share allocations provide (strategic) compensation for information revealed by institutional 
investors during the bookbuilding phase. Proceeds revisions serve as the measure of information 
acquired during the bookbuilding phase. Since the preceding discussion implies the endogeneity of 
proceeds revisions, an instrumental variables estimate of revisions, obtained by estimating the 
revision function f1(·), will serve as the explanatory variable. As a consequence, information 
spillovers enter the initial return model indirectly as instruments for proceeds revisions. 
The primary implication for initial returns from Benveniste et al. (2001) is the potential for 
smoothing across IPOs related by a common factor. Smoothing occurs if investment banks 
implicitly bundle IPOs to resolve coordination problems. One observable consequence of bundling 
should be a negative correlation between IPO volume and initial returns among firms subject to a 
common valuation factor. Thus Benveniste et al. predict a reversal of the positive correlation 
observed among IPOs at large when focusing on IPOs sharing a common valuation factor. 
Specifically, we expect bundling to lead to the following patterns: (i) lower percentage discounts on 
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average as the total cost of information production is spread across a larger bundle of firms, and (ii) 
a relatively smooth distribution of discounts across bundled firms.  
On the other hand, it stands to reason that there are limits to the bundling argument. IPOs in 
close proximity might be bundled effectively, but it seems less plausible that transactions widely 
separated in time could be, even if they were subject to a common valuation factor. Thus we expect 
the negative relation between initial returns and the number of related transactions only for deals 
early in the sequence. Experimentation with the definition of ‘early’ should therefore yield insights 
regarding the limits to the type of bundling Benveniste et al. envision.  
As control variables in the initial return model we include measures of underwriter choice and 
uncertainty surrounding the issuing firm. Both have previously been shown to influence initial 
returns [Beatty and Ritter (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990)]. Thus, our initial return model takes 
the following general form: 
 
Initial Returns = f2(proceeds revisions, bundling effects, underwriter choice,  [2] 
 firm-specific uncertainty, probability of withdrawal) 
 
Following Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001), we also include a measure of the probability of 
withdrawal to control for the possibility that a credible threat to obtain alternative financing 
provides bargaining power that diminishes any rents captured by informed investors in the form of 
initial returns. Controlling for this possibility is complicated by the endogeneity of the firm’s choice 
between completion and withdrawal conditional on information acquired during the bookbuilding 
phase. We address this concern using a two-stage Heckman procedure for which the first-stage 
probability model is developed next. 
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Information spillovers and the probability of withdrawal 
Data censoring associated with withdrawn offerings complicates the estimation of the effects of 
asymmetric information on the underpricing cost of going public. Recent studies take this problem 
into consideration [e.g. Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo (2001)] but ignore information spillovers. But 
if common factor information enters the public domain via the marketing of related IPOs, then the 
probability of completing an IPO will be conditioned on information spilling over from both its own 
marketing effort and those of contemporaneous offerings. Other things equal, we expect 
contemporaneous positive (negative) information spillovers to increase (diminish) the likelihood 
that a firm will complete its own offering.  
We also predict that the probability of completion is related to the issuer’s position in an IPO 
wave. If we again assume that uncertainty regarding the common valuation factor diminishes as 
additional firms attempt an IPO, then the marginal information generated by issuers late in a wave is 
less likely to be sufficiently negative to induce withdrawal. Other things equal, therefore, pioneers 
are more likely to withdraw than followers.  
Finally, we admit the possibility that the issuer’s bank can influence the likelihood of 
completion. This can take two forms. If reputation is linked to the gate-keeping role envisioned by 
Benveniste et al., more reputable banks should be better able to control free-riding among issuers 
subject to a common valuation factor. Thus, they should be associated with fewer withdrawals 
among (pioneering) firms if reputation is correlated with a capacity for spreading the (indirect) costs 
of acquiring information across subsequent offerings. Secondly, it is also possible that more 
reputable banks deal only with less risky firms for which the likelihood of acquiring substantial 
negative information during the bookbuilding process is low. Either argument predicts a positive 
correlation between underwriter reputation and the likelihood of completing an attempted offering.  
These arguments suggest the following probability model to test for dependence between 
information spillovers and the likelihood of completing an attempted IPO: 
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Pr(Completion) =  f3(information spillovers, issuer’s position in an IPO wave, [3] 
 firm-specific uncertainty, underwriter choice) 
 
 
Underwriter choice 
Equations [1]-[3] control for the issuer’s choice of underwriter. We model this choice explicitly to 
avoid problems stemming from endogeneity bias. For example, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) show 
that treating underwriter choice as exogenous leads to the erroneous inference that more prestigious 
underwriters are associated with higher underpricing in the U.S. in the early 1990s. The main 
determinant of underwriter choice that we consider is expected offer size. Habib and Ljungqvist 
argue that reductions in underpricing are worth more to the issuer’s owners at the margin, the 
greater the issue size. Therefore, issuers are more likely to take costly actions designed to reduce 
underpricing – such as hiring a top-tier bank – the more money they intend to raise. In addition to 
expected offer size, we control for firm-specific valuation uncertainty (riskier firms may have more 
to gain from information production and so may be more likely to hire a top-tier bank), and for the 
state of the IPO market in the lead-up to a firm’s S.E.C. filing. (Theory gives us no guidance as to 
the influence of the state of the IPO market on underwriter choice, but exploring a variety of 
possible specifications we invariably find significant effects.) Our model of underwriter choice is 
 
Underwriter Rank = f4(filing amount, firm-specific uncertainty, pre-filing state [4] 
 of the IPO market) 
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III. SAMPLE AND DATA  
III.A The data set 
The sample consists of firms that completed or withdrew an initial public offering between January 
1985 and December 2000. Thomson Financial’s SDC database lists 8,151 completed IPOs during 
1985-2000, from which we excluded 951 unit offers, 721 closed-end funds (including REITs), 175 
ADRs, and 71 limited partnerships.7 We then checked the remaining 6,233 offerings for 
misclassifications. This led to the following exclusions: 40 companies which were already traded at 
the time of their offering, 14 offers which were in fact units, 13 that were in fact REITs, 9 that listed 
exclusively outside the U.S., 8 that were in fact closed-end funds, 4 firms which were not operating 
companies, 2 offerings that were double-counted, and 2 that were offerings of preferred stock. This 
gives a sub-total of 6,141 IPOs. To this we added 40 companies which SDC listed in a previous 
download but which were excluded from recent listings. We verified that all 40 are bona fide IPOs 
meeting the above criteria. The final sample of completed IPOs consists of 6,181 observations.  
SDC also lists 1,427 withdrawn IPO registrations between January 1985 and December 2000. 
Further investigation revealed that five of these were not bona fide IPO registrations. Thus our 
sample of withdrawn IPOs consists of 1,422 observations.  
Using the S.E.C.’s EDGAR service, Investment Dealers Digest, the S&P Corporate 
Directories, and news sources in Reuters and Lexis-Nexis, we double-checked and hand-filled 
several data items in SDC relating to filing information (filing dates, withdrawal dates, amount to be 
raised, initial price range, number of shares to be offered), and firm characteristics (SIC code, VC 
backing, founding year, earnings per share in the most recent 12-month period before filing). In 194 
cases, we were unable to find a specific withdrawal date in either SDC or our other sources. Lerner 
(1994, pp. 312-313) describes the procedure for withdrawing an IPO registration. A registration 
                                                           
7 Unlike Loughran and Ritter (2000) we do not exclude IPOs with low offer prices. Dropping the 4.4% of sample firms 
with offer prices below $5 does not in any way alter our results. 
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which has not been formally withdrawn is typically deemed withdrawn by the S.E.C. 270 days after 
the last amendment date. This is the withdrawal date we use in the 194 cases.  
Initial returns are calculated using the first-day closing price reported by the Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) if it is available within 6 days of the offer date. Otherwise, we 
rely on SDC for the first-day closing price.  
 
III.B Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for firm and offering characteristics, broken down by completed 
and withdrawn IPOs. The average completed IPO (which we refer to as an ‘IPO firm’) is almost 13 
years old at the time of its offering, though we lack age data for nearly a third of the sample. 37% of 
IPO firms are venture-backed, and 34% operate in what we refer to as ‘nascent industries’ (3-digit 
SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737, covering the pharmaceuticals, 
computing, electronics, medical and measurement equipment, and software industries). Industry 
affiliation is the only firm characteristic we have for withdrawn IPOs. 30% of withdrawers come 
from nascent industries, a fraction which is marginally lower than for IPO firms (p=0.052). (To 
conserve space, we do not report test statistics for differences between completed and withdrawn 
IPOs in Table 1, leaving formal test results to Table 5 which reports the Heckman estimation results 
for the probability of completing an IPO. Here, we report p-values for difference tests in the text, 
where appropriate. All test statistics are adjusted for the upward bias caused by time clustering, by 
assuming that observations are independent for companies at different points in time, but not 
necessarily for companies which go public or withdraw in the same month.)  
As a measure of valuation uncertainty, we compute the extent to which the expected offer price 
reflects future growth opportunities (PVGO) rather than earnings from assets in place. Specifically, 
we compute an index 
][E
][E
][E P
REPSP
P
PVGO −
≡ , where E[P] is the expected offer price (the mid 
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point of the filing range) and EPS is earnings per share in the most recent 12-month period before 
filing, which we capitalize at the industry cost of capital R (the sum of the Fama-Bliss one-month 
risk-free rate in the filing month and the Fama-French (1997) CAPM risk premium estimate for that 
industry).8 The lower the PVGO index, the less ‘speculative’ the offering: a company which asks 
investors to pay E[P] mainly in return for rights to earnings from assets in place is, presumably, 
easier to value than a company whose offer price mainly reflects future growth opportunities. To 
illustrate, the typical manufacturing company has positive earnings and intends to go public mainly 
to reduce debt and so has a low PVGO index. The typical biotechnology or Internet company has 
negative earnings and intends to go public to finance its business plan and so has a high PVGO 
index. In our sample, the average company has an index value of 0.71, so 71% of its expected offer 
price reflects future growth opportunities rather than assets in place. 
The lower part of Table 1 reports the main offering characteristics. To measure underwriter 
reputation, we use the ten-point scale in Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh 
(1998). This averages 6.88 for IPO firms and a significantly lower 6.08 for withdrawers (p=0.001). 
The average IPO firm files to raise more money than the average withdrawer, $61 million vs. $51.6 
million (p=0.026). Table 1 also reports changes in offering characteristics, for IPO firms only, that 
occur between the registration and offer date. The average firm revises its proceeds up by 3.87%, 
from $61 million to $63.6 million, with most of the revision reflecting changes in the number of 
shares (+2.47%) rather than price revisions (+0.96%). Finally, initial returns average 20.2% in our 
sample.  
 
                                                           
8 We handfill missing and suspect EPS from S.E.C. filings, subsequent 10-Ks, or news sources. If EPS is negative, we 
set PVGO/E[P] equal to 1. If capitalized EPS is greater than E[P], we set PVGO/E[P] equal to zero. PVGO/E[P] is thus 
bounded between 0 and 1. 
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Information spillovers should be stronger amongst firms sharing a common valuation factor. We do 
not observe the common factor directly, so we investigate industry affinity, conjecturing that firms 
in the same or related industries are more likely to share a common factor. A straightforward way to 
define industry affinity is by SIC code. While this may accurately reflect commonalities in output, it 
has the drawback of ignoring functional or vertical relationships. Functional relationships may bind 
firms with different outputs but similar production or business processes. Vertical relationships may 
bind firms at different stages in the value chain. In either case, the IPO of a related company may 
generate valuation-relevant information. For instance, the positive reception for Netscape’s IPO in 
1995 presumably affected not only the IPO plans of firms in the same output space (browsers), but 
also of web retailers, software developers, server manufacturers and so on. Such firms do not 
necessarily share Netscape’s SIC code even at the one-digit level. 
Instead of SIC codes, we therefore use a set of industry aggregations derived by Fama and 
French (1997) in the context of estimating industry costs of capital. Fama and French aggregate 
firms by 4-digit SIC code into 48 industries. In Table 2 we show the corresponding industry 
breakdown of our IPO and withdrawer samples.  
 
III.C Spillovers and market conditions  
We attempt to capture information spillovers by measuring contemporaries’ 1) proceeds revisions 
and 2) initial returns, and the rate of 3) new registrations and 4) withdrawals. Contemporaries are 
defined as firms in the same Fama-French industry which file/complete/withdraw an IPO between 
firm i’s filing date and its offer or withdrawal date (the ‘bookbuilding phase’). In addition, we allow 
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for information spillovers from the period before firm i’s filing date. We consider different pre-
filing windows but report descriptive statistics only for a 3-month window.9  
For each information spillover metric, we report the standard deviation alongside the mean, as a 
measure of the noise in the information generated by contemporaries. To measure the rate of new 
registrations, we compute the aggregate filing amount of all new registrants in the same Fama-
French industry during firm i’s bookbuilding phase as well as the ‘relative filing amount’ (the 
aggregate filing amount in a Fama-French industry divided by the aggregate filing amount of new 
registrants across all industries). To measure the rate of withdrawals, we compute the absolute gross 
proceeds withdrawn as well as the ‘relative withdrawal frequency’ (the number of withdrawers 
during firm i’s bookbuilding phase, divided by the number of firms with active registrations at the 
time of firm i’s S.E.C. filing). 
In addition to IPO-specific spillovers, we investigate the influence of stock market conditions. 
We use a market-wide index (the equally-weighted NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ return from CRSP) 
and an industry-specific index. The latter is computed as the equally-weighted return on firms in a 
particular Fama-French (1997) industry, using the universe of firms available in CRSP. We also 
compute the relative return, which equals (1 + industry return)/(1 + market return). Relative returns 
greater than 1 indicate a Fama-French industry outperforming the market as a whole. (We do not 
attempt any risk adjustment given the short windows we consider.)  
Table 3 reports the spillover metrics and market conditions broken down by completed and 
withdrawn IPOs, for the three months pre-filing (Panel A) and the bookbuilding phase (Panel B). To 
illustrate the information in the table, consider firms that subsequently complete an IPO. These file 
their S-1s after a three-month period which saw an average of ten firms in their industry go public, 
                                                           
9 We use pre-1985 data from SDC to compute variables in three-month windows that extend back into 1984. Similarly, 
our measures of IPO activity during the year 2000 includes companies which were in registration in 2000 but had 
neither completed nor withdrawn their IPO by December 2000 and so weren’t themselves sample companies.  
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which experienced average initial returns of 20.9% after revising their proceeds up by an average of 
6.8%; while thirteen new registrations were filed for average intended proceeds of $51 million, 
representing 7.2% of the aggregate proceeds filed across industries; and only one firm withdrew, 
taking $22.3 million on average off the table. These pre-filing IPO conditions are statistically 
indistinguishable in the subsamples of IPO firms and subsequent withdrawers.  
Pre-filing market conditions, on the other hand, differ significantly. The average IPO firm files 
after a three-month return of 12.6% on the market index and 11% on the industry index, a relative 
return of 0.986. The average withdrawer files after a three-month return of 7.3% on the market 
index and 8.8% on the industry index, a relative return of 1.012. While the relative return in either 
case is not significantly different from 1 (p=0.108 and p=0.391), the difference in relative returns 
across the subsamples is significant (p<0.004). This indicates that subsequent withdrawers file after 
particularly strong relative performance in their industry.  
As Panel B shows, over the bookbuilding phase, the IPO market is considerably cooler for 
withdrawers than for IPO firms. Proceeds revisions for companies in the same industry average 
4.6% for the IPO firms and only 0.8% for withdrawers. This difference is significant at p<0.001. 
The variations in proceeds revisions and underpricing are significantly greater for the withdrawers 
(p<0.001 and p=0.035, respectively), indicating a noisier environment in the runup to withdrawal. 
There are significantly more contemporaneous withdrawals while withdrawers build their books (9 
versus 2, p=0.002). Fully 43.9% of the firms in the same industry that were in active registration at 
the time the average withdrawer filed its S-1 cancel their offerings during its bookbuilding phase, 
compared to only 9.3% for the average IPO firm (p<0.001). On the other hand, there are more new 
registrations, and for larger amounts on average, during the bookbuilding phase of subsequent 
withdrawers (p<0.001), though since the relative filing amount is the same (p=0.459), this merely 
indicates a general increase in IPO activity. 
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Looking at stock returns, the 20.6% market return during withdrawers’ bookbuilding phase 
stands out, but this is in large part driven by the longer time these firms spend in registration relative 
to IPO firms (285 vs. 75 days on average, p<0.001). More telling is the relative return. During the 
average IPO firm’s bookbuilding phase, its Fama-French industry index outperformed the equally-
weighted market index by 0.98% (significant at p<0.042), compared to –2.54% (p=0.117) for 
withdrawers. This difference in relative returns is significant at p=0.018.  
In sum, compared to withdrawers, firms completing their IPOs face an IPO market in which 
their contemporaries have larger proceeds revisions and withdraw less often, and the information 
spilling over from other offerings is less noisy, while their industry index does well compared to the 
market index. 
 
III.D IPO waves 
As noted earlier, spillover and bundling effects should be stronger at the beginning of a sequence of 
IPOs sharing a common valuation factor (an ‘IPO wave’) than later on. We therefore need to control 
for where in an IPO wave an offering occurs. We consider three different ways to identify the start 
of a new wave. For each Fama-French industry, we identify all S.E.C. filings not preceded by 
filings in the same industry in the previous 180, 120, or 90 days (the ‘pre-wave window’). We 
denote such filers ‘pioneers’. All other filers are ‘followers’. We distinguish between ‘early’ and 
‘late’ followers in three different ways. Early followers are those filing within 90, 180, or 360 days 
of a pioneer’s filing date. For instance, Scientific Computer Systems, which filed on October 2, 
1984, was the first company in the Fama-French ‘Comps’ industry to file for an IPO in more than 
13 months, making it a pioneer. It was followed by 4, 7, and 18 other filings during the next 90, 
180, and 360 days. We use these count measures to test the hypothesis that underpricing is lower, 
the more contemporaneous offerings an IPO can be bundled with. 
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Depending on the assumed length of the pre-wave window, Table 4 documents anywhere 
from 311 to 668 distinct IPO waves in our sample. A disproportionate number of these were started 
by firms which subsequently withdrew, consistent with pioneers facing a high degree of uncertainty 
when approaching the IPO market. The right-hand panel of Table 4 shows the distributions of early 
followers under each definition. For instance, with the 180-day pre-wave window, there are an 
average of .9, 1.8, and 3.7 early followers during the next 90, 180, and 360 days.  
 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The probability of completing the IPO 
Table 5 reports the results of our base-line specification summarized in equations [1]-[4]. Equation 
[3] relates the probability that an offering will be completed to measures of information spillovers 
during the bookbuilding phase, the offering’s position in the IPO wave, a control for firm-specific 
uncertainty (nascent industries), and the reputation of the underwriter. Underwriter reputation is 
assumed to be endogenous, so we first estimate a regression of equation [4]. Column (1) of Table 5 
reports the results. The dependent variable is the ten-point Carter-Manaster scale, and the 
explanatory variables are the log of the filing amount, a dummy for nascent industries to control for 
differences in firm-specific uncertainty, and two pre-filing spillover variables to control for the state 
of the IPO market. The explanatory power of the regression is very high, in view of the R2 of 
39.1%. As predicted, intended offer size is a highly significant determinant of underwriter choice, 
with a t-statistic of 36 (adjusted for time clustering). To illustrate the economic magnitude of the 
effect, consider a one standard deviation increase in (the log of) intended offer size from the sample 
mean, holding all other covariates at their respective means. This increases the underwriter rank 
chosen from 6.82 to 8.76.  
Firms in nascent industries are also, as predicted, more likely to choose more prestigious 
underwriters. The first pre-filing spillover variable indicates that firms choose less prestigious 
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underwriters, the higher were recent initial returns in their Fama-French industry in the three 
months before their filing. This effect is very strong statistically (p<0.001), though the economic 
significance is modest: a two-quartile increase in prior initial returns from the first quartile is 
associated with a reduction in underwriter rank from 6.9 to 6.81. A possible explanation for the 
negative sign is that issuers perceive less need for underwriter certification when investors are 
demonstrably willing to pay high prices for IPOs in their industry. We also find that firms choose 
more prestigious underwriters when their industry has accounted for a larger fraction of overall IPO 
activity in the previous three months (p<0.001), though again the economic significance is relatively 
modest.  
From this regression equation, we generate the instrumental variable for underwriter reputation 
included in the probit regression reported in column (2). Its coefficient estimate shows that firms 
lead-managed by more prestigious underwriters are more likely to complete an IPO (p=0.033). The 
measures of information spillovers during the bookbuilding phase all have the expected sign and all 
but one are highly significant (p<0.001). Specifically, companies are more likely to complete an 
offering, the more their contemporaries revise their proceeds upward and the greater contemporary 
underpricing. Increases in the variation of these measures reduce the probability of completion, 
consistent with our prediction that information spills over more easily the less noisy the 
environment. An increase in the relative withdrawal frequency (the number of withdrawers during 
firm i’s bookbuilding phase, divided by the number of active registrations at the time of firm i’s 
S.E.C. filing) reduces the probability of completion.10 Finally, stronger relative returns in firm i’s 
industry increase the probability of completion. The only spillover measure having no significant 
                                                           
10 While a Heckman procedure does not require an identifying variable (a variable included only in the selection 
equation and not in the second-stage regression), the presence of an identifying variable lessens the dependence on 
functional form to identify the model. We treat the relative withdrawal frequency as our identifying variable in the 
Heckman, and so exclude it from the second-stage regression for initial returns. Including it there does not, however, 
alter our findings. 
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effect is the relative filing amount (the aggregate filing amount of all new registrants in the same 
Fama-French industry divided by the aggregate filing amount of registrants across all industries).  
The two dummies for a deal’s position in the IPO wave indicate that pioneers are 14.6% and 
their early followers 5.5% less likely to complete their offerings compared to deals filed later in a 
wave. This is consistent with firms in the early part of an IPO wave facing a higher degree of 
uncertainty when approaching the IPO market.  
 
Since the proceeds revision and initial return equations [1] and [2] are estimated over the sub-
sample of completed offerings only, we augment the underwriter choice equation with additional 
right-hand side variables that were not available for the withdrawn offerings included in column (1). 
The results of the augmented underwriter choice regression are shown in column (3). In addition to 
the effects discussed earlier, we find that VC-backed companies choose significantly more 
prestigious underwriters, and that more speculative offerings (as measured by our PVGO index) are 
lead-managed by less prestigious underwriters.11  
 
Proceeds revisions 
Equation [1] relates a firm’s proceeds revision to spillovers from contemporaneous offerings and its 
position in the IPO wave, controlling for firm characteristics and underwriter reputation. In addition 
to spillovers from contemporaries, we allow for the possibility of spillovers from offerings in the 
three months before filing. These should be insignificant to the extent that they are already reflected 
in the preliminary deal terms at filing. The 2SLS results are reported in column (4). The positive 
and significant coefficient estimated for the Carter-Manaster rank (p=0.003) indicates that more 
prestigious underwriters are associated with greater positive revisions in proceeds and so differ in 
                                                           
11 Our results for equations [1] and [2] are unaffected whether we instrument underwriter choice using the results in 
column (1) or column (3).  
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their abilities, as predicted. Economically, the effect is very large: increasing the (instrumented) 
underwriter rank by one standard deviation from the mean of 6.96 would increase the log of 
proceeds revision from the sample mean of –0.72% to 6.85%. The effect remains positive if we do 
not treat underwriter reputation as endogenous, but the coefficient declines by 76%, or more than 
two standard errors. This illustrates the extent of endogeneity bias. A formal Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test rejects the null of exogeneity at p=0.019.  
The pre-filing spillover measures are invariably insignificant. This suggests that information 
arising from other offerings in the three months preceding filing is taken into account at the time of 
filing and so does not affect subsequent revisions.12  
During the bookbuilding period, information generated by other offerings in the same industry 
appears to spill over and affect sample firms’ proceeds revisions. In particular, firms’ revisions to 
proceeds increase with the proceeds revisions (p<0.001) and initial returns (p<0.001) of their 
contemporaries, and with the return in their industry relative to the market return (p<0.001). 
Economically, the magnitude of these effects ranges from increases of 3.5 to 4.8 percentage points 
for one standard deviation increases in the spillover variables. The rates of new registrations and 
withdrawals, on the other hand, have no significant effect. In other words, these decisions appear to 
reveal no information beyond that revealed by the contemporaneous IPO marketing efforts on 
which they are presumably conditioned. 
The coefficient estimated for the pioneer dummy (defined, as in Table 4, as the first IPO in a 
particular industry for at least 180 days) is positive and highly significant (p=0.003). The estimate 
indicates that pioneers increase their proceeds by 5.5 percentage points more, on average, than 
follower firms. Given that the average proceeds revision is –0.7%, this is a large difference. Taken 
                                                           
12 This contrasts somewhat with the findings of Lowry and Schwert (2001) who show that pre-filing information, in the 
form of market index returns measured over fixed 50-day windows before the effective day, affects price revisions in 
their sample.  
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together with the negative coefficient in the withdrawal probit in column (3), this is evidence of an 
asymmetric response function for pioneers: they withdraw in response to negative information and 
increase their offer size in response to positive information. The early followers, by contrast, do not 
experience significantly different proceeds revisions (relative to later offerings), which is what we 
expect if they incorporate the pioneer’s information production when filing their S.E.C. 
registrations.  
To control for differences in valuation uncertainty, we include four company and offer 
characteristics: the log of the filing amount, two dummies for venture-backed IPOs and companies 
operating in ‘nascent’ industries, and the PVGO index. Companies that file larger amounts have 
smaller subsequent proceeds revisions (p=0.002), mirroring the findings of Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
that larger offerings are less risky. Venture-backed companies are marginally less aggressively 
repriced (p=0.081). We find no difference in revisions between nascent and other industries. 
Finally, proceeds revisions are larger the more speculative the offering, as measured by our PVGO 
index (p=0.001). It is intuitive that more speculative offerings have more to learn during 
bookbuilding, though unconditionally such learning could be either positive or negative. However, 
the coefficients in column (4) are estimated conditional on not having withdrawn, so it makes sense 
that more speculative offerings on average learn positive news and so revise their proceeds up.  
In view of the R2 of 9.3%, a large amount of variation in proceeds revisions remains 
unexplained. This points to the importance of private (unobservable) information acquired from 
informed investors during bookbuilding [Benveniste and Spindt (1989)]. Information on the 
evolution of the book – which is not generally available to researchers [but see Cornelli and 
Goldreich (2001)] – would presumably help account for this unexplained variation.  
Because the R2 reported in Table 5 is based on a regression that includes variables other than 
information spillover measures, it is not a direct estimate of the importance of information 
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spillovers alone. Dropping all non-spillover variables, we obtain an R2 of 8.3%, which gives us a 
better sense of how much information spillovers contribute to the price discovery process in IPOs.  
 
Initial returns 
Equation [2] relates a firm’s initial return to its proceeds revision, underwriter choice, withdrawal 
probability (the inverse Mills ratio generated from the probit model in column (2)), capacity for 
bundling, and firm characteristics. Following Lowry and Schwert (2000), we allow for asymmetry 
in the relationship between proceeds revisions and initial returns by using a piece-wise linear 
specification. Specifically, we include a second term that equals proceeds revisions if they are 
positive and zero otherwise.13 The second term captures the marginal effect of positive revisions on 
initial returns. We also control for the previously documented positive relationship between IPO 
volume and initial return [Lowry and Schwert (2000)] by including the number of filings (across all 
industries) in active registration on a firm’s offering date. Note that we distinguish this general ‘hot 
market’ relationship from bundling; bundling predicts that initial returns are lower, the more 
offerings subject to a common valuation factor an IPO can be bundled with. Equation [2] does not 
include the pre- or post-filing spillover measures, as these affect initial returns indirectly through the 
instrumented proceeds revision variable.  
The 2SLS results are reported in column (5).14 The overall explanatory power of the regression 
is good, in view of the R2 of 20.7%. The coefficient estimated for log proceeds revisions is positive 
but not significant, whereas the coefficient estimated for positive-only revisions is strongly positive 
(p<0.001). The implication is that initial returns are unrelated to negative proceeds revisions, but 
                                                           
13 Both terms are treated as endogenous in the 2SLS estimation. The positive-only term is instrumented from the first-
stage predicted values of proceeds revisions. 
 
14 For details regarding Heckman selectivity corrections in 2SLS models, see Maddala (1983), pp. 234–235. 
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increase strongly in positive proceeds revisions. This asymmetry is consistent with Hanley’s (1993) 
‘partial adjustment’ phenomenon.  
Interestingly, the Carter-Manaster rank variable is not significantly related to initial returns. 
Recall that in column (4), underwriter reputation is positively related to the extent of information 
acquisition, as measured by a firm’s proceeds revisions. Thus, underwriter quality appears to 
influence initial returns indirectly through its effect on information production, rather than directly. 
The indirect effect is what we would expect in the Benveniste-Spindt (1989) framework, for more 
active and prestigious banks should have more leverage to extract information from investors, 
leading to more aggressive proceeds revisions. The direct effect is what we would expect in the 
Carter-Manaster (1990) and Booth-Smith (1986) framework which models prestigious underwriters 
as transferring ‘certification’ benefits rather than offering superior information production.  
The inverse Mills ratio is positive and significant (p=0.032), so as the probability of withdrawal 
increases, firms experience higher initial returns. This is inconsistent with the argument in Busaba, 
Benveniste, and Guo (2001), where a greater withdrawal probability is interpreted as providing 
issuers with more bargaining power in extracting information from investors (and so less money is 
left on the table).15 The economic magnitude of our effect, however, is small: a one standard 
deviation increase in the inverse Mills ratio (from 25.4% to 47.5%) increases initial returns only 
from 20.2% to 21.9%. 
One possible explanation for this result is a countervailing force implied by the Benveniste et al. 
theory. Holding the cost of information production/acquisition fixed, average percentage initial 
returns should be lower when there are more issuers present to share information costs. We have 
already documented that potential issuers are more likely to withdraw an attempted IPO when their 
                                                           
15 Our estimation sample and system differ in important respects from Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo’s. Busaba et al. use 
data from 1990 to 1992 only, and treat underwriter choice and filing revisions as exogenous. If we do likewise, we can 
reproduce their finding that initial returns decrease in the withdrawal probability. However, if we extend the sample 
period, or treat underwriter choice and filing revisions as endogenous, or both, we can no longer replicate this result. 
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contemporaries are withdrawing theirs. Thus, characteristics that suggest a high probability of 
withdrawal imply that fewer contemporaneous offerings sharing a common factor will be completed 
and so fewer firms will be present to bear costs imposed indirectly via underpricing. But expected 
percentage underpricing must be sufficiently deep to support a number of firms “costlessly” 
acquiring information through a withdrawn offering, otherwise it will not be incentive compatible 
for investors to reveal private information in the first place. 
We thus think of the bargaining power and cost-sharing theories as predicting countervailing 
effects on initial returns as a consequence of a higher probability of withdrawal. The sample at large 
suggests that the cost-sharing theory dominates. Further insight into the plausibility of this argument 
can be gained by discriminating between firms in nascent and mature industries. If the former are 
characterized by a greater reliance on intangible assets, which are less easily financed with debt, 
they will have fewer alternative sources of finance and so less bargaining power. Consistent with 
this distinction, we report in the next section that the direct relation between initial returns and the 
probability of withdrawal is concentrated among firms in nascent industries. Among firms in mature 
industries, the withdrawal probability has no statistically significant effect on initial returns. 
We do not include the two dummies for a deal’s position in the IPO wave, because – assuming 
underwriters do bundle IPOs – initial returns should be smoothed across a sequence of offerings 
subject to a common valuation factor and so the dummies should not be significant (indeed, they are 
not). Instead, we include a control for the capacity for bundling. The more offerings there are in an 
IPO wave, the more bundling can occur and so the lower are initial returns. In Table 5 we report the 
results of using the number of IPO filings in the first 180 days of an IPO wave to proxy for bundling 
capacity. As we will show in Section V, we obtain stronger (weaker) results if we extend (reduce) 
the length of time over which we assume bundling to occur. The coefficient estimate is negative, as 
predicted, and significant (p=0.047). The coefficient suggests that each additional offering with 
which an IPO can be bundled reduces initial returns by 32 basis points.  
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In contrast to these results regarding bundling, we find that initial returns increase in the number 
of filings (across all industries) in active registration on a firm’s offering date (p<0.001). This 
mirrors Ritter’s (2000) findings on the effect of hot IPO market conditions on underpricing. The 
effect is relatively large: a one standard deviation increase in the number of registered offerings 
from the mean increases underpricing by nearly four percentage points.  
The coefficient estimates for firm characteristics, included to control for firm-specific 
uncertainty, show that initial returns are higher in nascent industries (p=0.002) and the more 
speculative the offering according to our PVGO index (p<0.001). We also find that venture-backed 
IPOs are marginally more underpriced (p=0.066), which contrasts with the findings reported in 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) for the 1980s. We do not include offer size in the initial return 
regression, as Habib and Ljungqvist (1998) show that initial returns decrease in offer size as a 
matter of identities, even when uncertainty is held constant.16  
 
Summary 
The results presented in Table 5 are strongly consistent with the predictions of Benveniste, Busaba, 
and Wilhelm (2001) and our discussion in Section II. We have found  
• that information production about common valuation factors spills over, affecting both the IPO 
decision and revisions in offer terms; 
• that learning diminishes over a sequence of IPOs related by a common valuation factor, such 
that pioneers experience larger proceeds revisions than followers; and 
• evidence consistent with investment banks spreading the cost of information production, in the 
form of underpricing, across multiple issuers. 
                                                           
16 IPO proceeds clearly increase in the number of newly issued shares. In contrast, the post-issue price of a share is 
decreasing in that number, because the issuance of a greater number of new shares that are sold at a discount implies 
higher losses from dilution. The lower post-issue price, combined with an unchanged issue price absent any change in 
uncertainty, imply lower underpricing. 
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In the next section, we report several additional tests that speak to the robustness of our results. 
 
V. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
Bundling and IPO waves 
Perhaps the most arbitrary elements of the analysis relate to our definitions for ‘pioneer’ firms and 
‘IPO waves’. The results for the withdrawal and proceeds revision equations shown in Table 5 
assume that a pioneer is a firm whose filing is the first in its Fama-French industry for at least 180 
days. If we change this window to 90 or 120 days, corresponding to the alternative definitions set 
out earlier in Table 4, the coefficient estimates change by no more than half a standard error. We 
thus continue to find that pioneers are more likely to withdraw than their followers, and that they 
are associated with significantly greater proceeds revisions conditional on completing their IPOs.  
The results for the initial returns equation shown in Table 5 assume that the early part of a wave 
(during which bundling seems most plausible) lasts for 180 days following the pioneer’s filing. If 
we lengthen this window to 360 days, the coefficient estimated for the bundling variable changes 
from –0.0032 (p=0.047) to –0.004 (p<0.001). If we shorten the window to 90 days, the coefficient 
estimate is –0.0018, which is not significant. Thus the results reported in Table 5 suggest that if we 
are detecting bundling tactics, then they are carried out over relatively long horizons.  
The bundling variable used in these specifications is the total number of firms that file in the 
first 90, 180, or 360 days after the pioneer’s filing. This number could be an overestimate of the 
capacity for bundling, as it includes offerings lead-managed by banks that are not party to the effort 
to spread the information production costs across a sequence of deals. Instead, we might require that 
an offering can only effectively be bundled with deals that involve one of its lead- or co-managers. 
With this narrower definition, bundling continues to have a significant and negative effect on initial 
returns, but only if we assume the early part of the wave to last for 360 days.  
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All bundling counts used in Table 5 are, by construction, identical for each firm in the early 
part of a given wave: if the wave has 20 firms filing in its first T days, then the bundling variable 
equals 20 for the pioneer and all followers during the first T days. Implicitly, this assumes that 
underwriters have a good idea how many firms there will be in a wave, and spread the information 
production costs accordingly. A less demanding assumption would be to allow bundling with all 
firms (in the same Fama-French industry) that are in active registration on firm i’s offer date. To 
illustrate the difference, if the rate of registrations increases over the first T days of a wave, we now 
allow firms going public later to have more bundling candidates than those at the beginning of the 
wave. Again, we can distinguish between a bank-specific count and a general count. In either case, 
we find that bundling has a significant and negative effect on initial returns if we assume the early 
part of the wave to last for 360 days (p=0.035 and p<0.001 for the bank-specific and general case, 
respectively). 
Overall, our results are robust to alternative ways of capturing bundling capacity, especially 
when we allow windows of 180 or 360 days. 
 
Defining contemporaries 
As an alternative to defining contemporaries by Fama-French industry, we might use 3- or 4-digit 
SIC codes. In either case, our results are little changed in terms of signs and significance, except 
that the underpricing experience of contemporaries ceases to be significant in the withdrawal 
probability model. Coefficient estimates for the 4-digit SIC model are generally noisier than for the 
3-digit SIC or Fama-French model. 
Which model captures spillovers best? If we include spillover measures at the 3-digit SIC level 
in the Fama-French model of Table 5, we find that the same Fama-French variables are significant 
as in the Table 5 specification, while the 3-digit SIC variables are only occasionally significant. If 
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we repeat the ‘horse race’ with spillovers measured at the 4-digit SIC level, the Fama-French 
variables are again generally significant while the 4-digit SIC variables virtually never are.  
Taken together, these results suggest that our results are not driven by the way we define 
contemporaries, but that our Fama-French-based definition has more power to detect spillovers than 
SIC-based definitions. 
 
Sample period 
Our sample period includes the Internet-related hot issue market of 1999 and early 2000 which in 
many ways was extreme. Underpricing during this period averaged 63.7%, the total amount of 
‘money left on the table’ was $65.576 billion (almost twice the total in the previous 14 years), and 
SIC code 737 (software and IT related services) alone accounted for 20% of IPO activity by gross 
proceeds. To investigate whether our results are driven by the inclusion of this extreme market, we 
re-estimate our model from Table 5 over the years 1985-1998. The results are unchanged in terms 
of signs and so continue to support the spillover and bundling predictions. The few changes in 
significance hardly affect our conclusions. The positive effect of the relative filing amount (the 
aggregate filing amount in a Fama-French industry divided by the aggregate filing amount of new 
registrants across all industries) on the probability of completing an IPO becomes significant 
(p=0.021) when in Table 5 it was insignificant. This suggests that the rate of new registrations 
positively affects a firm’s completion probability. Firms in nascent industries cease to be associated 
with higher-ranked underwriters in the column (3) specification.  Pre-filing information, in the form 
of underpricing amongst firms in the same Fama-French industry, does affect proceeds revisions 
significantly (p=0.002). The ‘partial adjustment’ effect of proceeds revisions on initial returns 
ceases to be asymmetric. More prestigious underwriters are associated with lower initial returns 
(p<0.001), pointing to a direct ‘certification’ effect of top underwriters that works alongside the 
  
29
‘information production’ effect coming from proceeds revisions. Finally, the coefficient for 
bundling capacity in the column (5) specification drops in significance to p=0.1.  
 
Nascent vs. mature industries 
Benveniste et al. argue that information externalities associated with IPOs will be more severe, and 
therefore command more attention from an intermediary, in developing industries where value 
depends more heavily on growth opportunities and other intangible assets. In new industries public 
offerings are often associated with the introduction of new technology or intangibles over which a 
market consensus has not been achieved. In such cases, feedback from the primary market is quite 
valuable on the margin, both to the pioneering firm and those who might follow. Thus both the 
magnitude of the externality problem and the potential benefits from its resolution are likely to be 
more pronounced. We investigate this hypothesis by partitioning the sample into ‘nascent’ and 
mature industries and re-estimating the Table 5 specification in each sub-sample.  
The results lend further support to the predictions of the Benveniste et al. model. The 
regressions of equations [1] and [2] have much greater explanatory power in the subsample of 
nascent industries: in the proceeds revisions regressions, R2 is 18.2% for nascent industries vs. 4.4% 
for mature firms; in the initial return regressions, R2 is 21.7% for nascent industries vs. 11.1% for 
mature firms. This is consistent with firms in nascent industries benefiting more from the 
information production of contemporaneous offerings. The coefficient estimates confirm this 
interpretation: generally speaking, firms in nascent industries are more sensitive to the spillover 
measures than mature companies. For instance, in the proceeds revision regressions, the relative 
industry return has a coefficient of 0.765 in the nascent industries vs. 0.378 among mature 
companies, so a given degree of outperformance by a firm’s own industry translates into a larger 
proceeds revision in nascent industries. Unlike mature companies, firms in nascent industries revise 
their proceeds up in response to information revealed in increases in the rate of new registrations in 
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their own industry (p=0.006). In the initial return regression for nascent industries, the positive 
effect of the withdrawal probability (the inverse Mills ratio) is fifteen times larger than in mature 
industries. As discussed earlier, this suggests that the cost-sharing argument of Benveniste et al. 
dominates the bargaining argument of Busaba et al. in our sample.  
Most of the coefficients have the same sign in the two subsamples. The main exception 
concerns pioneers in the proceeds revision. Compared to their followers, pioneers in nascent 
industries have smaller proceeds revisions (p=0.03) while pioneers in mature industries have larger 
proceeds revisions (p=0.005).17 One possible interpretation of this finding follows from our earlier 
conjecture that mature industries depend less on intangible assets and therefore should have more 
fallback financing opportunities. If so, this finding might indicate that pioneers in mature industries 
have more bargaining power with investors and therefore suffer a less severe partial adjustment to 
the acquisition of private information. 
 
Pre-filing windows 
The pre-filing information that we use in the underwriter choice and proceeds revisions regressions 
is measured over the three months (12 weeks) before firm i’s filing date. Using shorter windows of 
between 1 and 11 weeks, we find similar results: underwriter choice continues to be related to pre-
filing market conditions (except for the four-week case) while proceeds revisions are related only to 
spillovers occurring during the bookbuilding phase and not to pre-filing information. 
 
                                                           
17 We also find differences in the effect of VC-backing and underwriter choice in the initial return regressions. In 
nascent industries, initial returns increase in the instrumented Carter-Manaster rank (p=0.019) while VC-backing has no 
significant effect. In mature industries, initial returns decrease in the instrumented Carter-Manaster rank (p=0.028) 
while VC-backing has a positive effect (p=0.002). These differences are driven by the 1999/2000 hot issue market. 
When we restrict the estimation to the 1985-1998 period, the positive effects of underwriter rank in nascent industries 
and of VC-backing in mature industries disappear. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Our empirical analysis suggests three principal conclusions:  
• Firms attempting IPOs learn from the experience of their contemporaries. These information 
spillovers affect the decision whether to carry through with an offering and revisions in offer 
terms. Although we cannot measure them directly, we think it stands to reason that firms 
considering an IPO would enjoy similar benefits. 
• Learning diminishes over a sequence of IPOs related by a common valuation factor, such that 
pioneers experience larger proceeds revisions than followers. In other words, potential issuers 
incorporate the experience of their contemporaries in the initial terms proposed in the 
preliminary prospectus.   
• The evidence is broadly consistent with investment banks maintaining sufficient market power 
to spread the cost of information production, in the form of underpricing, across multiple 
issuers. One apparent consequence of this behavior is that while initial returns and IPO volume 
are positively correlated in the aggregate, the correlation is negative among contemporaneous 
offerings subject to a common valuation factor. 
As such, our findings are consistent with the Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2001) argument 
that the dynamics of volume and initial returns in primary equity markets reflect, at least in part, an 
institutional response to information externalities. 
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Table 1.  
Summary statistics for sample of IPOs completed or withdrawn during January 1985-December 2000. 
The sample consists of companies which completed or withdrew an initial public offering between January 1985 and December 2000. A registration which has not been formally 
withdrawn is typically deemed withdrawn by the Securities and Exchange Commission 270 days after the last amendment date. This is the withdrawal date we use in 194 cases for 
which we were unable to find a specific withdrawal date in either SDC or news sources. Age is IPO year minus founding year (from SDC and S&P directories). VC backing is 
from SDC and augmented using Venture Capital Journal articles and IPO filings. ‘Nascent’ industries are 3-digit SIC codes 283, 357, 366, 367, 381, 382, 383, 384, and 737. 
PVGO/E[P] is an estimate of the extent to which the expected offer price reflects future growth opportunities rather than earnings from assets in place. It is computed as (E[P] – 
EPS/R)/E[P], where E[P] is the expected offer price (the mid point of the filing range) and EPS is earnings per share in the most recent 12-month period before filing, which we 
capitalize at the industry cost of capital R (the sum of the Fama-Bliss one-month risk-free rate in the filing month and the Fama-French (1997) CAPM risk premium estimate for 
that industry). We handfill missing and suspect EPS from S.E.C. filings, subsequent 10-Ks, or news sources. If EPS is negative, we set PVGO/E[P] equal to 1. If capitalized EPS is 
greater than E[P], we set PVGO/E[P] equal to zero. Higher values of the PVGO index indicate greater valuation uncertainty. To measure underwriter reputation, we use the ten-
point scale in Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). In cases of more than one lead-manager, we average the ranks. In cases of missing Carter-Manaster 
ranks for the lead, we use the (average) rank of the co-manager(s) if available; otherwise, we assign a rank of 8 to commercial banks which entered the IPO underwriting business 
(e.g. Chase Securities, J.P. Morgan) and zero to everyone else. We hand-fill missing filing information (date, amount, number of shares, price range) from S.E.C. filings and 
Investment Dealers Digest. Gross proceeds excludes the over-allotment option where exercised. All revision variables equal (actual/filed – 1). Initial returns are calculated using 
the first-day closing price which we take from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) tapes if available within 6 days of the offer date, and else from SDC.  
 
 Completed offerings  Withdrawn offerings 
 
No. of
obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
No. of
obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Number of firms 6,181      1,422     
Firm characteristics              
Age at IPO (years) 4,450 12.79 19.52 0 7 182       
VC-backed (fraction) 6,181 0.37           
Nascent inds. (fraction) 6,181 0.34     1,352 0.30    
PVGO/E[P] 6,174 0.71 0.33 0 0.82 1       
Offering characteristics              
Carter-Manaster rank 6,181 6.88 3.01 0 8.75 9 1,422 6.07 3.67 0 8 9
Filing amt. ($m) 6,111 60.989 202.496 0.060 28.000 10440.000 1,388 51.564 94.433 0.100 30.300 2475.000
No. shares filed 6,112 4,347,128 10,900,000 10,000 2,500,000 360,000,000       
E[P] ($/share) 6,174 11.62 4.50 0.01 11.50 55.50       
Gross proceeds ($m) 6,181 63.565 216.826 0.069 27.550 10620.000       
No. shares sold 6,181 4,487,419 11,000,000 11,500 2,500,000 360,000,000       
Offer price ($/share) 6,181 11.71 5.23 0.01 11.00 56.50       
Proceeds revision 6,111 0.0387 0.3118 -0.9770 0.0000 3.9587       
Share revision 6,112 0.0247 0.2236 -0.9800 0.0000 9.4167       
Price revision 6,174 0.0096 0.2211 -0.6774 0.0000 3.4444       
Initial return 6,136 0.2022 0.4257 -0.4327 0.0750 6.2667       
Table 2. 
Industry breakdown. 
IPOs are assigned to one of the 48 industries groupings used in Fama and French (1997). Five of the completed and 70 of the withdrawn IPOs lack SIC codes and so cannot be 
assigned to a Fama-French industry. 
 
Industry 
name Long name SIC codes 
Completed
IPOs
Withdrawn
IPOs
Aero Aircraft 3720-3729 14 4
Agric Agriculture 0100-0799, 2048 22 2
Autos Automobiles and trucks 2296, 2396, 3010-3011, 3537, 3647, 3694, 3700-3716, 3790-3792, 3799 57 10
Banks Banking 6000-6099, 6100-6199 437 53
Beer Alcoholic beverages 2080-2085 15
BldMt Construction materials 0800-0899, 2400-2439, 2450-2459, 2490-2499, 2950-2952, 3200-3219, 3240-3259, 3261, 3264, 
3270-3299, 3420-3442, 3446-3452, 3490-3499, 3996 
60 19
Books Printing and publishing 2700-2749, 2770-2799 46 8
Boxes Shipping companies 2440-2449, 2640-2659, 3210-3221, 3410-3412 14 4
BusSv Business services 2750-2759, 3993, 7300-7372, 7374-7394, 7379, 7399, 7510-7519, 8700-8748, 8900-8999 1,300 306
Chem Chemicals 2800-2829, 2850-2899 58 12
Chips Electronic equipment 3622, 3661-3679, 3810, 3812 415 57
Clths Apparel 2300-2390, 3020-3021, 3100-3111, 3130-3159, 3965 60 16
Cnstr Construction 1500-1549, 1600-1699, 1700-1799 72 17
Coal Coal 1200-1299 4 1
Comps Computers 3570-3579, 3680-3689, 3695, 7373 325 54
Drugs Pharmaceutical products 2830-2836 223 63
ElcEq Electrical equipment 3600-3621, 3623-3629, 3640-3646, 3648-3649, 3660, 3691-3692, 3699 53 14
Enrgy Petroleum and natural gas 1310-1389, 2900-2911, 2990-2999 90 26
FabPr Fabricated products 3400, 3443-3444, 3460-3479 11 6
Fin Trading 6200-6299, 6700-6799 114 70
Food Food products 2000-2046, 2050-2063, 2070-2097, 2090-2095, 2098-2099 53 11
Fun Entertainment 7800-7841, 7900-7999 98 34
Gold Precious metals 1040-1049 12 3
Guns Defense 3480-3489, 3760-3769, 3795 3 2
Hlth Healthcare 8000-8099 214 49
Hshld Consumer goods 2047, 2391-2392, 2510-2519, 2590-2599, 2840-2844, 3160-3199, 3229-3231, 3260, 3262-3263, 
3269, 3630-3639, 3750-3751, 3800, 3860-3879, 3910-3919, 3960-3961, 3991, 3995 
92 13
Insur Insurance 6300-6399, 6400-6411 180 32
LabEq Measuring and control equipment 3811, 3820-3830 109 17
Mach Machinery 3510-3536, 3540-3569, 3580-3599 123 12
Meals Restaurants, hotel, motel 5800-5813, 5890, 7000-7019, 7040-7049, 7213 150 25
MedEq Medical equipment 3693, 3840-3851 216 48
Mines Nonmetallic mining 1000-1039, 1060-1099, 1400-1499 6 5
Misc Miscellaneous 3900, 3990, 3999, 9900-9999 11 3
Paper Business supplies 2520-2549, 2600-2639, 2670-2699, 2760-2761, 3950-3955 37 8
  
36
PerSv Personal services 7020-7021, 7030-7039, 7200-7212, 7215-7299, 7395, 7500, 7520-7549, 7600-7699, 8100-8199, 
8200-8299, 8300-8399, 8400-8499, 8600-8699, 8800-8899 
74 12
RlEst Real estate 6500-6553 24 15
Rtail Retail 5200-5299, 5300-5399, 5400-5499, 5500-5599, 5600-5699, 5700-5736, 5900-5999 366 81
Rubbr Rubber and plastic products 3000, 3050-3099 39 9
Ships Shipbuilding, railroad equipment 3730-3731, 3740-3743 11 1
Smoke Tobacco products 2100-2199 5
Soda Candy and soda 2064-2068, 2086-2087, 2096-2097 20 4
Steel Steel works etc. 3300-3369, 3390-3399 64 11
Telcm Telecommunications 4800-4899 280 85
Toys Recreational products 0900-0999, 3650-3652, 3732, 3930-3949 78 13
Trans Transportation 4000-4099, 4100-4199, 4200-4299, 4400-4499, 4500-4599, 4600-4699, 4700-4799 131 28
Txtls Textiles 2200-2295, 2297-2299, 2393-2395, 2397-2399 31 7
Util Utilities 4900-4999 88 15
Whlsl Wholesale 5000-5099, 5100-5199 271 67
   
Total   6,176 1,352
Table 3.  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for pre-filing spillover variables. 
This Panel reports conditions in the IPO market and stock market as a whole in the run-up to each firm’s filing date. We have filing dates for 6,167 of the 6,181 completed and all 
of the withdrawn IPOs. Five of the completed and 70 of the withdrawn IPOs cannot be assigned to a Fama-French industry. The sample thus consists of 6,162 completed and 1,352 
withdrawn IPOs. The first four categories in Panel A reflect conditions in the IPO market in the three months prior to firm i’s filing date (the pre-filing phase). For each category, 
we report the average and standard deviation, as well as the number of contemporaneous IPOs on which the estimates are based. Proceeds revisions and initial returns are as 
defined in Table 1. Gross proceeds exclude over-allotment options. New registrants are companies filing S-1s with the S.E.C. during i’s pre-filing phase. The relative filing amount 
is the aggregate filing amount of all new registrants in the same Fama-French industry divided by the aggregate filing amount of registrants across all industries. The market return 
is the combined equally-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ return from CRSP. The Fama-French industry return is computed as the equally-weighted return on firms in a 
particular Fama-French (1997) industry, using the universe of firms available in CRSP. The relative return is computed as (1+Fama-French industry return)/(1+ market return).  
 
 Completed offerings (N=6,162)  Withdrawn offerings (N=1,352) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Proceeds revisions            
Mean 0.0680 0.2121 -0.8649 0.0226 3.9587 0.0727 0.2051 -0.6547 0.0133 1.8000
St.dev. 0.1910 0.1694 0 0.1855 2.4457 0.1923 0.1745 0 0.1843 1.2255
No. of firms revising their proceeds 10 15 0 4 86 12 18 0 4 85
Initial returns             
Mean 0.2094 0.3090 -0.2500 0.1234 2.5648 0.2507 0.3751 -0.3214 0.1138 2.4100
St.dev. 0.1998 0.2955 0 0.1047 2.5278 0.2350 0.3433 0 0.1009 1.9223
No. of firms going public 10 15 0 5 86 12 18 0 4 85
Gross proceeds of new registrants            
Mean ($m) 51.095 93.805 0 33.652 4266.600 56.762 91.294 0 38.988 1687.993
St.dev. 51.807 141.757 0 21.203 2649.802 59.960 194.298 0 23.316 2570.420
No. of new registrants 13 21 0 6 148 18 30 0 6 148
Relative filing amount  0.0719 0.0855 0 0.0359 0.5764 0.0784 0.0962 0 0.0340 0.5103
Gross proceeds of withdrawers            
Mean ($m) 22.345 48.438 0 0 1350.000 27.371 41.902 0 3.963 378.000
St.dev. 8.396 22.217 0 0 255.690 10.800 24.135 0 0 255.690
No. of withdrawn offerings 1 3 0 0 42 2 4 0 1 44
Market returns            
Market return: mean 0.1261 0.1105 -0.2948 0.1231 0.4911 0.0726 0.1005 -0.2889 0.0679 0.4189
Market return: st.dev. 0.0052 0.0022 0.0022 0.0048 0.0226 0.0058 0.0028 0.0022 0.0052 0.0256
Fama-French industry return: mean 0.1096 0.1558 -0.4017 0.0927 1.7411 0.0881 0.1753 -0.4152 0.0592 1.5403
Fama-French industry return: st.dev. 0.0078 0.0042 0.0018 0.0069 0.0399 0.0088 0.0054 0.0021 0.0074 0.0358
Relative return 0.9861 0.0995 0.6128 0.9769 1.9590 1.0115 0.0990 0.6770 0.9992 1.9922
Table 3.  
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for post-filing spillover variables. 
Contemporaries are defined as all IPOs in the same Fama-French industry between IPO i’s filing date and its offer or withdrawal date (the bookbuilding phase). The first four 
categories reflect conditions in the IPO market during the bookbuilding phase. For each category, we report the average and standard deviation, as well as the number of 
contemporaneous IPOs on which the estimates are based. In each case, IPO i itself is not included in the calculation. New registrants are companies filing S-1s with the S.E.C. 
during i’s bookbuilding phase. The relative withdrawal frequency is the number of withdrawers during i’s bookbuilding phase, divided by the number of active registrations at the 
time of i’s S.E.C. filing. (This ratio need not be less than one.)  
 
 Completed offerings (N=6,162)  Withdrawn offerings (N=1,352) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Proceeds revisions            
Mean 0.0461 0.1971 -0.9000 0 3.9587 0.0083 0.1518 -0.6000 0 0.8667
St.dev. 0.1736 0.1667 0 0.1617 1.5299 0.2259 0.1573 0 0.2337 1.0457
No. of firms revising their proceeds 10 20 0 4 483 25 42 0 9 420
Initial returns             
Mean 0.1920 0.2923 -0.3000 0.1020 3.1483 0.1867 0.2532 -0.3214 0.1036 2.8757
St.dev. 0.1874 0.2891 0 0.0865 3.1315 0.2378 0.2953 0 0.1341 3.0008
No. of firms going public 10 20 0 4 483 25 43 0 9 419
Gross proceeds of new registrants            
Mean ($m) 49.120 91.277 0 32.041 2450.000 67.810 167.890 0 44.867 4266.600
St.dev. 47.428 160.953 0 15.981 4183.669 70.342 171.085 0 34.014 2919.502
No. of new registrants 13 27 0 4 662 32 56 0 11 572
Relative filing amount  0.0737 0.0940 0 0.0340 0.6895 0.0758 0.0908 0 0.0345 0.5224
Gross proceeds of withdrawers            
Mean ($m) 21.366 42.977 0 0 1350.000 40.750 57.434 0 29.809 1239.600
St.dev. 8.365 32.841 0 0 1410.685 23.322 64.355 0 9.558 1747.119
No. of withdrawn offerings 2 6 0 0 149 9 18 0 2 116
Relative withdrawal frequency 0.0932 0.1927 0 0 5.0000 0.4385 0.5613 0 0.3000 5.0000
Market returns            
Market return: mean 0.0651 0.1072 -0.2953 0.0454 1.7208 0.2062 0.4053 -0.2667 0.1195 7.8572
Market return: st.dev. 0.0052 0.0026 0 0.0045 0.0351 0.0072 0.0037 0.0020 0.0056 0.0210
Fama-French industry return: mean 0.0771 0.1581 -0.4413 0.0472 2.1636 0.1859 0.5111 -0.5837 0.0816 7.4838
Fama-French industry return: st.dev. 0.0079 0.0047 0 0.0069 0.0406 0.0107 0.0070 0 0.0082 0.0445
Relative return 1.0098 0.0812 0.6014 1.0018 2.1995 0.9746 0.1732 0.5151 0.9692 2.6132
Table 4. 
IPO waves. 
We consider three different ways to identify the beginning of a sequence of IPOs sharing a common valuation factor 
(an ‘IPO wave’). For each Fama-French industry, we identify all S.E.C. filings not preceded by filings in the same 
industry in the previous 180, 120, or 90 days. We denote such filers ‘pioneers’. All other IPOs are ‘followers’. We 
distinguish between ‘early’ and ‘late’ followers in three different ways. Early followers are those which file within 
90, 180 or 360 days of a pioneer’s filing date. The right-hand side panel shows the distributions of early followers 
under each definition.  
 
Wave begins when no 
S.E.C. filing in same 
Fama-French industry 
 total
number of
waves begun by a pioneer who
 Number of
followers
in the next     
in the previous…  went public withdrew … Mean Std. Min Median Max
… 180 days  311 240 71       
       … 90 days 0.9 1.4 0 0 11
       … 180 days 1.8 2.4 0 1 19
       … 360 days 3.7 5.5 0 2 40
            
… 120 days  491 379 112      
       … 90 days 2.7 3.4 0 1 16
       … 180 days 5.5 7.5 0 3 37
       … 360 days 10.3 15.6 0 4 93
            
… 90 days  668 531 137      
       … 90 days 6.0 6.9 0 3 26
       … 180 days 11.1 13.8 0 5 52
       … 360 days 17.8 24.8 0 6 122
        
 
 
Table 5. 
System estimation. 
Endogenous right-hand-side variables are instrumented using 2SLS. Pre-filing spillover variables are computed 
using all firms in the same Fama-French industry during the three months before firm i’s filing date. Bookbuilding 
spillover variables are computed using all firms in the same Fama-French industry between i’s filing and offer or 
withdrawal date. The definition of each spillover variable is as in Table 3. IPO wave and bundling variables are 
defined as in Table 4. ‘Firms in active registration’ refers to companies who had neither completed nor withdrawn a 
filed offering on firm i’s offer date. Company/offer characteristics are defined as in Table 1. Column (2) is the first 
stage of the Heckman 2SLS model in column (5). Standard errors are adjusted for time clustering by assuming that 
observations are independent for companies at different points in time, but not necessarily for companies which go 
public or withdraw in the same month. They are more conservative than White (1980) standard errors. ***, **, *, † = 
significant at 0.1%, 1%, 5% or 10% (two-sided), respectively. 
 
Column: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Dependent variable: 
Carter-
Manaster 
rank  
Dummy=1 
if IPO 
completed  
Carter-
Manaster 
rank  
ln(proceeds 
revision)  
Initial 
return 
 OLS  Probit  OLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Endogenous variables      
ln(proceeds revision)     0.204 
     0.174 
ln(proceeds revision) if positive, 0 else     2.193*** 
     0.382 
Carter-Manaster rank  0.027*  0.039** 0.002 
  0.013  0.013 0.003 
Inverse Mills ratio     0.079* 
     0.037 
Pre-filing spillover variables      
Average initial returns -0.442***  -0.381** 0.032  
 0.119  0.133 0.031  
Relative filing amount 1.142**  1.314** -0.008  
 0.417  0.454 0.079  
Bookbuilding spillover variables      
Average proceeds revision  0.751***  0.241***  
  0.156  0.035  
St.dev. proceeds revision  -1.074***  -0.102*  
  0.159  0.044  
Average initial returns  0.988***  0.120***  
  0.244  0.031  
St.dev. initial returns  -1.115***  -0.030  
  0.223  0.040  
Relative filing amount  0.290  0.027  
  0.283  0.065  
Relative withdrawal frequency  -1.756***    
  0.188    
Relative return  1.109***  0.521***  
  0.337  0.063  
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Column: (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
IPO wave/bundling      
Dummy=1 if pioneer (180-day window)  -0.508***  0.055**  
  0.123  0.018  
Dummy=1 if early follower (next 180 days)  -0.215**  -0.001  
  0.082  0.016  
No. of filings in first 180 days of wave     -0.0032* 
     0.0016 
Hot issue market      
No. of all filings in active registration      0.0007*** 
     0.0001 
Company/offer characteristics      
ln(filing amount) 1.606***  1.514*** -0.065**  
 0.044  0.048 0.021  
Dummy=1 if VC-backed   1.361*** -0.034† 0.029† 
   0.067 0.020 0.015 
Dummy=1 if in ‘nascent’ industry 0.486*** 0.093* 0.195** 0.018 0.034** 
 0.072 0.046 0.074 0.012 0.011 
PVGO/E[P]   -1.335*** 0.070*** 0.084*** 
   0.105 0.020 0.016 
Constant 1.358*** 0.201 2.281*** -0.650*** -0.098** 
 0.201 0.356 0.239 0.069 0.037 
      
Diagnostics      
R2 / McFadden’s R2 39.1 % 19.7 % 41.4 % 9.3 % 20.7 % 
Test: all coefficients = 0 (p-value) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
No. of observations 7,491 7,429 6,102 6,061 6,061 
      
 
 
 
